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problematic for dynamic ecological, political and socio-economic systems.  Although Ostrom 
(2007) has demonstrated the importance of the need for local input into ‘evolutionary’ rule 
making, governance of marine resources has increasingly moved away from local 
communities of resource users to regional, national, and even international institutions.  
Inshore and deep-sea fisheries around the UK, for example, are under threat from highly 
centralised policies that manage and control fishing, marine conservation, seabed mineral 
extraction, and energy generation.  Despite the overlapping and complex institutional 
arrangements to manage fisheries regional management approaches (such as the North 
Sea Cod Recovery Plan) are not achieving their stated goals; stocks of many species 
remain low, and numbers of fishermen are declining with negative impacts on local 
communities and associated supporting service industries.  Recent and potential legislative 
change at UK and EU level suggests there are opportunities for exploring community-based 
institutional arrangements that may enhance the resilience of a range of institutional 
structures governing fisheries and a wider range of marine resources.  Resilience in a 
complex marine environment requires capacity for adaptation within the interaction between 
ecological and socio-economic systems, to enable continued ecological functioning, value 
creation in the face of change, and effective management.  The paper explores the 
effectiveness of multi-layered governance on marine resource management.  In particular, it 
examines the institutional arrangements influencing the interplay between ecological, 
political, and socio-economic systems in relation to the marine environment, and their 
capacity for adaption and resilience.   
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Introduction 
A significant literature has grown up around the concepts of institutional change, 
resilience and adaptation in relation to commons management.  In particular there 
has been concern about the failure of institutional arrangements on commons in the 
face of exogenous change, which have been identified in all parts of the globe. 
 
This paper takes as a starting point Birkes’ (2006) need to look “…beyond the 
community-based resource paradigm, towards commons governance in complex 
systems”, particularly in marine resource management where, “…the importance of 
institutions that straddle levels and provide incentives for sustainability is 
increasingly recognized…”.  Birkes suggests commons management should be 
understood as ‘the management of complex adaptive systems’, and presents three 
‘scale challenges’:  Failure to recognize important scale and level interactions  Mis-matches between levels and scales in human-environment interactions  Failure to recognize heterogeneity in the way scales are perceived and 
valued by different actors (or, ignorance, mis-match and plurality).   
Birkes also suggests the principle of subsidiarity is the most suitable approach for 
dealing with cross-scale issues – in other words decisions should be taken as 
closely as possible to those affected, while Ostrom’s design principles, as modified 
by Cox et al. (2010), asks whether design principles developed at community level 
are applicable at larger scales.  Both views are suggesting that scale will influence 
the identification of solutions to commons resource governance problems.   
 
The paper explores the complex nature of resource management with multiple 
interacting variables and the need for cross-level and cross boundary relationships 
occurring both within and between ecological and socio-economic systems; with the 
realisation it may never be possible to identify the key variable(s) or relationship(s) 
that ensure the sustainable management of the socio-ecological system.  Rather 
than examine the huge range of multiple variables and drivers influencing social, 
economic, political and ecological relationships, the paper asks: ‘what are the 
factors that give rise to resilience in a system?’.  Figure 1 below illustrates the 
direction of influence in some of the relationships of a fisheries focused socio-
ecological system.  It highlights the wide range of factors potentially affecting 
management of the fisheries resource, and that is before one even begins to 
explore cultural, political, market forces and institutional relationships. 
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Figure 1: Factors influencing a marine resource system 
 
 
The focus on ‘change’ suggests that ecological and socio-ecological systems must 
have the capacity to adapt to impacts and influences that impinge on the system.  
Adaptability is viewed as a key ingredient of resilience – adaptability of the 
ecosystem and of the socio-cultural system with which it is related.  Adaptability 
assumes that change is inherent as systems are in dynamic equilibrium and never 
static (although they may have the appearance of static systems in the short run).  
Ecological perturbations occur constantly in relation to population dynamics, 
predator-prey relationships, food availability, and other environmental and climatic 
drivers.  Adaptability of institutional structures are less well understood, as are the 
processes of institutional change, which also alter continuously, though at different 
rates and in response to market drivers, political goals, cultural values as well as 
ecological factors.   A key to understanding the process is the time period over 
which change is examined – institutional change always involves a time lag as a 
result of institutional inertia, lack of information, and pressures to maintain the status 
quo. 
 
 
Exploring the concept of resilience 
Resilience is often put forward as the key requirement for system integrity in the 
face of disturbance, shock, or stress.  Identification of those factors that make a 
system more or less resilient can sometimes be seen as the ‘holy grail’ of socio-
ecological management.  As a result a large literature has appeared around the 
concept, which has spread from its original ecological application to other 
disciplines, and in the process the term has become more ambiguous, and acts 
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more as a means of enabling interdisciplinary work through shared but imprecise 
meanings. (Brand and Jax, 2007)   
 
The concept has been disaggregated into differences between ecological, social, 
and institutional resilience (Fabricius et al, 2007; Adger, 2003), with some 
recognition of the importance of the linkages between them.  Thus, ecological 
resilience can be thought of as relating to the capacity for an eco-system to 
withstand change, or restore itself following some external shock; social resilience 
might be thought of in terms of stability of organisational components in the face of 
change; and institutional resilience can be related to the stability of social 
relationships such as trust and accountability between actors in a system.  In broad 
terms resilience of both social and ecological systems relates not only to the 
capacity for each to adapt to change, but also on the linkages between them.  If an 
ecosystem cannot adapt to changing environmental conditions being imposed 
(climate change for example), it will not matter how effectively the social system 
alters in response to the change, the whole socio-ecological system is likely to 
collapse.  Alternatively, if a socio-economic system changes, creating greater 
pressure on a particular aspect of an ecological system, (overfishing of a species, 
for example) the result may be the elimination of that species completely, wider 
ecological effects, and consequent impacts on the communities dependent on 
utilisation of that species as a resource.  The identified features of resilience include: 
‘the ability to absorb or buffer disturbances while maintaining core attributes’ 
(Pradhan, 2006); and ‘the ability…to cope, persist and adapt to hardship, crisis or 
changes…while increasing ability to meet future challenges’ Tucker (2008)  A 
‘resilient’ ecosystem may be able to survive relatively intact even under long periods 
of poor management and failure of the social system, and ‘resilient’ institutions may 
be able to adapt to a reduction in a particular species, for example, through greater 
regulation and control of harvesting.   
 
Gunderson and Holling (2002) discuss resilience in general terms as ‘the magnitude 
of disturbance that can be absorbed before a system flips from one state to another’ 
and suggest that resilience in an ecosystem (with respect to variation in 
environmental conditions) depends on the existence of species capable of 
supporting key ecological functions as conditions vary (one benefit from substitute 
or ‘redundant’ species in an ecosystem may be to provide stability).  Factors that 
contribute to resilience in a socio-economic system are less clear but will depend on 
the continued operation of key institutional arrangements operating within and 
across scales, the size of the unit of analysis and the time period over which factors 
operate.  Institutional arrangements that may appear to damage the ecosystem in 
the short term, for example timber harvesting operations in a forest ecosystem, may 
be adequate when viewed ecosystem resilience is viewed over the long term 
(Carlsson, 2000).  On the other hand, intimate knowledge of the resource, often 
cited as a key aspect of effective long-term management, does not always result in 
resilience and can blind resource users to wider changes affecting society and 
economy, especially those socially or institutionally isolated.   
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Resilience does not always mean the best forms of commons management survive.  
There are examples (e.g. certain areas of common land in England) where creation 
of ‘negative’ social capacity has resulted in control of the commons resource by a 
small elite, who keep out other entitled rights holders through some form of 
intimidation, and situations where the institutional arrangements that perpetuate 
management systems are at odds with the changing agricultural conditions and 
ecological goals.  The institutional arrangements are ‘resilient’ but exclusive, in 
terms of benefit sharing.  Resilience may also result in degradation of the resource 
through continuation of poor or inappropriate management practices.  Overgrazing, 
for example, was the result on some upland commons when headage payments 
made livestock farming more attractive.  Organizations and institutions that currently 
exist to manage a commons resource may be resilient to change, but may not 
necessarily provide optimum benefits to society. (North, 1994).  The concept of a 
‘rigidity trap’ or, ‘static engineered resilience rather than ‘dynamic, ecological 
resilience’, has been put forward (Atwell et al., 2009) to explain how ecosystems 
with high external inputs might appear to function at optimum levels but lose ability 
to respond to ‘adaptive cycles of growth, collapse, reorganisation and exploitation’.  
Factors operating at different scales in the socio-ecological system can also 
combine to create a static configuration that resists change.   
 
Research in community management in India suggests multi-layered decision 
making and accountability structures are often more effective, as the capacity to 
make small adjustments makes institutions resilient to internal disturbances; while 
alliances and networks that cross several different boundaries are needed to deal 
with external disturbances.  But in order to understand resilience one also needs to 
explore the question of: resilience for what purpose and for whom?  (Pradhan, 2006) 
 
Resilience in a commons management system relates to the capacity of the 
interactions between ecological and socio-economic systems both to create value 
and maintain the systems in the face of external pressures or changes.  Resilience 
in a commons thus requires adaptability in the interaction between an ecological 
system and a socio-economic system to enable both continued ecological 
functioning and value creation in the face of economic, social, political and/or 
environmental change.  A natural system managed as a common property resource 
is a particular form of socio-ecological system, where the aim is the long-term 
optimization of social, economic and ecological values across a defined community. 
Thinking of resilience in terms of the interplay between ecological and socio-
economic systems focuses attention on factors that influence or control that 
interaction and its capacity to adapt, providing the possibility of identifying key 
variables making the interaction more, or less, resilient.  Key characteristics of 
resilience for a commons resource may include: 
 
Ecological  Capacity to cope with external stress  Capacity to replenish/restore without significant loss of function 
 
Socio-economic 
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 Ability to continue to support vibrant communities in the face of external 
disturbance and stress  Capacity for rules, ways of doing, and conventions to evolve  Capacity for trust relationships to endure in the face of external or internal 
disturbances  Capacity for ‘value creation’ 
 
Institutional  Capacity to change without losing ability to effectively manage the resource 
of interest  Capacity for ‘transparency and accountability’  to remove ambiguity and 
distrust  Networks and a diversity of actors 
 
 
 
Resilience in the North Sea fishery 
The EU Common Fisheries Policy established in 1983 (and currently under review) 
set up a management system based on total allowable catch and allocation of 
national quotas.  In the UK the quota is allocated to producer organisations, 
although the inshore fisheries also have their own quota allocation.  Creation of 
individual quotas has resulted in concentration of quota into a smaller number of 
hands as the smaller and less economically efficient owners have sold out to larger 
operators.   In addition minimum size requirements and problems of targeting single 
species in a mixed fishery has led to problems of illegal landings and discard 
(throwing away under-sized, poorer quality, or over-quota fish).  One estimate of 
discards suggests up to 1 million tonnes fish are discarded every year in the North 
Sea alone (accounting for one third of the total catch).  (Scacht and Bongert, 2008).  
It has been suggested that the quota system is a form of crisis management rather 
than a long-term sustainable approach (Symes, 2005). 
 
The EU situation is interesting as an example of an attempt to create a ‘common 
pool’ resource at a regional level but with limited local scale input.  The North Sea 
fishery can be viewed as an ecosystem impacted by environmental changes, with a 
large number of stakeholders including fishermen (commercial and recreational), 
food processors, national and EU policymakers, scientists, energy interests, 
conservationists, and mineral extraction companies, that has also suffered for a long 
time from institutional failures resulting in significant social and economic impacts on 
fishing communities.  It is a socio-ecological system under pressure and 
experiencing deep changes over a period of decades, which has transformed an 
open access fishery to a semi-privatized system based on quotas, where entry into 
the system is expensive and limited.  The ecological system is complex with high 
level of uncertainty over the condition of the resource at any one time resulting in 
management of a mixed fishery through controlling the catch of each species 
separately. (Simmonds and Jardim, 2012) 
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The CFP claims to be focused on recovery and management of sustainable stocks 
of fish, yet fishing effort has become more concentrated in the hands of large 
commercial operators with limited or no links to specific coastal communities.  It has 
been argued that small scale, inshore fishermen operate in a more sustainable 
manner, and deliver a higher quality product, yet are being squeezed out of the 
industry.  They are more flexible in where and when they fish, are linked to specific 
coastal communities, and deeply concerned over the management of stocks.  Local 
knowledge, built up from years of experience, is still important for inshore fishermen, 
providing information on where and how to fish for a variety of species at different 
times of the year. 
 
 
Exploring alternative management options 
As part of the preparations for improving the resource management under the 
revised Common Fisheries Policy a small scale survey was carried out for the EU 
Commission Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) 
to examine fishermen reactions to four alternative management regimes:  
 
Management Approach 1: 
•  Continue the current management plan (landing Total Allowable Catch 
controls (TACs), effort controls) 
•  Simplified derogations for fleets that demonstrate reductions in the Cod catch 
through adoption of avoidance or technical measures 
 
Management approach 2:  
•  Mixed fishery catch quotas reduced to match across species 
•  In-year increases if Cod catches are kept below specific limits  
 
Management Approach 3:  
•  Individual vessel/business catch quotas set at single species level 
•  Vessel must tie up once any single quota is exhausted  
 
Management Approach 4:  
•  Effort based real-time incentives 
•  Each vessel allocated ‘fishing credits’ 
 
Each approach was explained more fully in the questionnaire using a sketch of a 
fishing boat and short summaries highlighting key aspects of the proposed 
management regime.  Each management approach was described using the 
minimum of information to explain the main aspects of the approach.  The same set 
of questions was asked about each management approach in turn to obtain 
respondent views on whether the approach would be more difficult, no different, or 
easier than the current situation for the following activities: 
  Managing my fishing effort  Controlling costs  Managing my Cod quota 
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 Managing my quota for other species   Reducing discards of Cod  Reducing discards of other species  Using my knowledge and judgement about when and where to fish  Fish safely   Adapting my effort to the weather and other environmental conditions 
Respondents were also asked to indicate potential financial impacts, i.e. changes in 
annual income, profit, input costs (fuel, supplies, new gear, repairs), and number 
and type of crew employed, and provide an indication of how difficult they felt it 
would be to enforce the approach. 
 
 
Results 
An on-line questionnaire was developed (due to resource constraints) to explore 
views of fishermen to the four different management options.  Nineteen useable 
responses were received.  All respondents operated in the North Sea, 4 in the West 
of Scotland, 2 in Eastern Channel, and 4 in other areas.  A total of 12 respondents 
were targeting Cod, and other key species include Haddock, Saithe, Whiting, and 
Monkfish.   
 
Option 3 (Individual vessel/business catch quotas set at single species level; vessel 
must tie up once any single quota is exhausted) was viewed as the least favourable 
approach.  More than half of respondents indicated that under this option the 
following activities would be more difficult:  Managing my fishing effort  Managing my Cod quota  Managing my quota for other species   Reducing discards of Cod  Reducing discards of other species 
In addition more than half of respondents indicated the approach would have a 
negative impact on annual income and profit.  Five respondents indicated that 
managing effort, cod quota and cod discards would be easier, and four indicated a 
positive impact on annual income from fishing activities.  When asked for specific 
opinions on the approach the focus of respondents was on the impact of the quota 
issue on their activities and problems identified included:   
 
“I cannot take all my quota” 
 
“It will not work because the small quota on Whiting would stop 
you fishing within weeks” 
 
“Unworkable – impossible to stop fishing when one species is 
caught” 
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“Lack of Cod quota and the cost of renting quota” 
 
“Most would be forced to sell up or go bankrupt” 
 
“Lack of quota for certain species - Hake and Coley” 
 
“Unworkable - impossible to stop fishing when one species 
caught” 
 
“Cannot stop fishing when one species is caught” 
 
Respondents also indicated that the perceived abundance of Cod caused problems 
in terms of meeting or exceeding their quotas.   
 
“It’s impossible to fish and avoid Cod due to their abundance” 
 
“There has always been a dominant species, - trying to 
regulate the fishery on one species will always result in abuse 
and discards of the dominant species” 
 
When asked about benefits of the approach, respondents also focused on the quota 
issue: 
   
“Vessels with high quota will be able to fish as they should 
those that have no quota will have to stop fishing sooner” 
 
“Reducing discards and getting extra quota in long term will 
reduce leasing costs” 
 
“Vessels that have quota will be able to fish as they should be, 
those that have no quota and most of the discards will have to 
stop fishing sooner” 
 
The views provided by the respondents suggests that those who had adequate 
quota would be better off under this management approach, but those with low 
quota (i.e. small-scale fishermen) would suffer, because as soon as their quota for a 
species was used up they would have to tie up.  The nature of the on-line 
questionnaire suggests that some of the respondents picked up on this particular 
aspect of the proposed approach and it strongly influenced their opinion. 
 
Other management options received mixed responses.  Option 2 (Mixed fishery 
catch quotas reduced to match across species; in-year increases if Cod catches are 
kept below specific limits) was also seen as problematic having a negative impact 
on controlling costs, controlling quota, and discarding.  The key problem was the 
reduction in quotas to match the mix of species in the fishery, and the potential for 
increasing species quota being dependent on reducing the Cod catch.  In a mixed 
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fishery where Cod is perceived (by fishermen) to be increasing in abundance the 
potential for reducing Cod catches was viewed as extremely difficult, and thus 
creating a situation where catch across all species would be reduced.  Management 
approach 4 received fewer responses, partly due to the nature of the approach, 
which was completely new to most respondents, and required a more in-depth 
explanation. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Fishermen perceptions of management option impact 
 
 
Techniques for enforcing management regimes 
A key aspect of any management regime is enforcement of the rules as this will 
determine the extent to which it will meet its objectives.  Controlling a fully disclosed 
fishery (FDF) system in combination with any of the options for regulating discarding 
practises requires monitoring of the fishing activity at sea where the discarding takes 
place. There are four enforcement tools that allow for that; on board observers, 
patrol vessels, aircraft and CCTV-systems (sensors, GPS, cameras). Other 
enforcement tools such as landings- and administrative controls can be used to 
identify irregularities in the length and catch composition that indicates that 
discarding has been taken place.  CCTV-systems can provide coverage of the entire 
fishing activities for a fraction of the cost of other enforcement tools at sea making it 
highly attractive from an enforcement perspective, with the additional benefit of 
providing highly useful information on fishing activity through GPS data. 
 
The responses suggest a high level of support for particular implementation 
techniques.  There appears to be general support for activities such as banking and 
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borrowing from one year to the next, and surprisingly, for CCTV.  Examples of 
responses include: 
 
“CCTV is very good on reducing Cod discards and making 
the skipper think where to fish and with what size nets” 
 
“Reducing discards and getting extra quota in the long term 
will reduce leasing costs. I’m in favour of expanding CCTV to 
certain boats/species” 
 
“Banking and borrowing is a good idea, with a 15% limit, 
allows for mistakes and unexpected catch” 
 
In terms of ease of enforcement the majority of respondents felt that Option 1 
(closest to the current situation) would be easiest to enforce; and Option 2 the most 
difficult.  Respondents were equally divided over the ease with which Options 3 and 
4 could be implemented with half thinking they would be easier and half thinking 
they would be more difficult.   
 
 
 
Table 2: Management Options: ease of enforcement 
 
 
Enforcement regimes within mixed fisheries management using quotas are not 
straightforward.  In order to achieve a good level of compliance the initial allocation 
of quotas is important, in fisheries with a large overcapacity the initial allocation is 
difficult, particularly the allocation of quota to ‘choke’ species to achieve relative 
stability.  This suggests the need for a borrowing system (e.g. buying, renting, or 
borrowing from a future year/using savings from aprevious year) that can bridge 
compliance periods to allow for possibilities that cover an unexpected catch and 
provide flexibility but it adds to the control burden for authorities.   Table 3 below 
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summarises some of the key issues surrounding use of enforcement tools indicating 
the central role of on-board CCTV.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Evaluation of controls 
 
 
Summary of the fishermen survey 
The views of fishermen are based on a very small sample, and the management 
options presented range from the known and familiar (Option 1) to the unfamiliar 
(Option 4), which would undoubtedly influence perceptions.  Option 4 (real time 
incentives), which is the least familiar is the most difficult to interpret with no clear 
set of views emerging.  This might be due to lack of familiarity with the ideas 
presented.  Option 3 is the least preferred and appears to have the highest 
perceived negative financial impacts.   
 
A major focus of respondents throughout all management approaches was on quota 
and a perception of relative Cod abundance.  Respondents with enough quota 
suggest that Options 2 and 3 would be less damaging than those with limited quota, 
who see option 3 in particular as restricting their fishing opportunities.  The main 
negative impacts for Options 2, and 3 apply to the following activities:  Managing my fishing effort  Controlling costs  Managing my Cod quota  Managing my quota for other species  
Evaluation 
crtieria 
Management Measure 
CQM /FDF-
discard ban 
CQM /FDF- 
with no discard 
ban 
Individual 
catch quota 
Gear  Area and 
area 
closures 
Controllability High Low High Low High 
Cost 
effectiveness 
High Low High Low  Medium  
Compliance  Medium Low Medium Medium High 
Enforcement 
measures  
CCTV CCTV CCTV Checks at 
sea,  and on-
shore 
Checks at 
sea VMS  
Infringement 
type 
Discarding Mis-reporting  Over-fishing Technical  Illegal 
fishing 
practice  
Incentives  Higher quotas 
Access to 
closed areas 
Exemptions 
from landing 
obligations  
Etc. 
Higher quotas 
Access to 
closed areas 
Exemptions 
from landing 
obligations 
None Additional  
Quotas for 
certain gear.  
None 
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 Reducing discards of Cod 
Activities least impacted by the proposed measures relate to:   Using my knowledge and judgement about when and where to fish  Fish safely   Adapting my effort to the weather and other environmental conditions 
There is support for implementation actions such as CCTV and banking/borrowing 
from one year to the next.   
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Evidence of action to make the system more resilient include the following:   Fishermen switching from mixed activities to focusing on unregulated species 
(e.g. Brown Crab)  short-term investments, e.g. in crabbing and shrimping  EU focus on banning of discards and landing the whole catch 
At the local level the focus is on economic survival.  There are few or no new 
entrants due to entry costs (difficulties of obtaining quota) and minimal economic 
return.  Current fishermen continue to operate because of lifestyle.  The current 
pressures are not short term, they are long-term based on overfishing (resulting 
from improvements in technology and excess fishing capacity), along with continual 
reductions in quota and restrictions on catch and days at sea to avoid further 
damage to declining fish stocks.   
 
Making a common resource such as a mixed fishery more resilient depends not just 
on the capacity for adaptation but also on understanding institutional weaknesses in 
relation to goals of commons management.  If the institutional weaknesses are 
understood energy can be focused on the forms of change that will be most 
effective.  The small-scale survey of fishermen provided almost the only social 
science based input into the Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Committee for Fisheries (STECF) research on a range of alternative management 
options.  It demonstrated two important facts: first, that fishermen are not averse to 
strict enforcement regimes (such as CCTV); and second, that the role of quotas is of 
overriding significance for fishermen both financially and operationally.  Quotas are 
generally recognised as a blunt instrument in managing a mixed fishery where more 
selective controls are needed, along with flexibility to allow for unexpected catches 
of untargeted species.  To date, effort controls (days at sea) and quotas have not 
succeeded in either reducing the negative impacts of fishing on the ecosystem, or in 
making fishing a more financially stable activity capable of benefitting local 
communities.  Until a more flexible set of management controls are adopted the 
North Sea fishery, as a socio-ecological system, will lack resilience, and the 
consequences will remain unpredictable for both socio-economic and ecological 
communities involved.   
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